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FORREST W. FULLER, 
11958 
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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MAX E. BIRCH and FONTELLA BIRCH, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
V'S. 
FORREST W. FULLER and JUDITH 
HYDE FULLER, his wife; KENNETH 
W. JUDD and RUBY F. JUDD, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8822 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgmenlt granted plaintiff-re-
spondents by i!he D:i:Sttriot Court of Duchesne County, State of 
Utah, againSit the defendant-appe!lla'll!ts £m trespass 'and slander 
of title. 
On or 'ab0111t January 31, 1957, the respondenll:s entered into 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract w:iJth de£endanJt Robert E. Sather 
(Plaintiff's' Exhibit "A") whe["eby the responde'll!ts agreed to sell 
and Sather agreed to buy the ranch of respondenlbs. On or about 
\1aruh 31, 1957, Sat!heT and 'the respo1J11derrts executed a mortgage 
:iJn favor of Seour:iJty Loan and Finance OorporaJtion (Plaintiffs' 
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Exhibit "C"). ConCllrr'ently t!herewith the respondents and 
Sa1t!her, Judd and Fuller entered inlto the fol1owing !agreement: 
"This is to acknowledge that K·ennetlh W. Judd and 
Forres•t W. Fuller agree to make all paymerllts upon 
the foregoing note and to save Robert R. Salt!her com-
pletely harmless therefrom. Max E. Birch rand Fontella 
Birch agn~e to credit !the principal·and inTerest of said 
note upon their U rrifurm Real Eslf:are Contmct with 
Sa1t!her, ood Sather agrees to assign all of his inrerest in 
and to said contract rto Fuller and Judd at such time 
as the foregoing note to Security Loan rand F,inaJnce is 
paid in fuH together wirth interest 11hereon." (Plainitiffs' 
E)Chibit 'T'). 
On or about !the 23rd day of April, 1957, appellrantt Fuller paid 
the sum of $290.00 ttn the fioonce company in acoordance wi'l!h 
said agreement and had the Sather-Birch real estate OOilltracl: 
recorded. On or about May 1, 1957, Max E. Birch and Sather 
enltered inlto an option agreement :for the same .Jand described 
in rthe prior Uniform Rool Estate Contract (Plaintiffs' E:rlribit 
"E") without notice to any of the ~ parties. Subsequent 
thereto, on or about May 4, 1957, defendallllt Sall:!her executed a 
release of the Uniform Real E·state Contract (Pllainltiffs' Exhibit 
"B"). 
Subsequent to the ·execution of the Sather-Biroh option, 
appellanlt Kennetlh W. Judd and defendant F. A. Hatch entered 
upon rhe property of respondents, buHt corrals and fences tihere-
on and peacefully engaged in varied agricultu!ra.!l pursu!irts with 
the knowledge of respondents and withOUit objection on tlhe 
part of respondents. Responden1ts' admi!l!ted reason for their 
lack of objection was the Sarther-Birch option agreemen!t (Trans-
script, Birah D 7-9, and C 53-54). 
At the close of Plaintiffs' case defendants moved for dis-
mi'S'sa:l and when dmlied entered a stipulation into !the record as 
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to what defen~' wimesses wouLd testify to. The Court dis-
missed ~as to tJhe defendants Sather upon motion of !reSpondents 
(ReOOTd, 47); found :that .. no money judgmenrt is to be entered 
against 'the defendant, F. A. Haltch."; and entered judgment 
against appelhmts for $128.00 "actual damages" 'and $500.00 att-
tomey's fee for slander of tide, and, $877.00 less $43'5.0 set_,off 
for trespass. From this judgment and 1tlhe order of the Court 
denying appelants' motion to dismis:s appellants appea1. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS' FIRST CAUSE OF 
A:CTION AND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT THEREUNDER 
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING 'RESPONDENTS 




THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS' FIRST 
CAUSE OF ACTION AND IN GRANTING JUDG-
MENT THEREUNDER FOR SLANDER OF TITLE. 
"The elemen1tary principle ·is wel:l settled lthaJt malice, 
expi~ess or implli'ed, is an es,senJtial element in actions for 
slander of title . . . It ~follows 'that no 'action wi:ll lie 
where 'a statement in shl!Illder of ltit!le or property, al-
thoug~h false, was made in good fai!th wil!ih probable 
caus;e fioc beHeving ~t, ... Again, one who ihaJs reasonable 
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ground Ito suppose himself possess·ed of rthe legal title 
to lands, o'l· an equiJty ~therein which would enabl'e him 
:to maintain an action for a conveyance, is not Hable in 
damages in an action fur ·slander of tii?le." 33 AMER-
ICAN JURISPRUDENCE 313, 314, Section .348. 
"M,a:lice or want of good fari:th and waTilt of prob-
abLe cause are es,senlti'al elements of the action of slander 
of title, and damages oanniQit be recovered where :i1t ap-
pears !that such erement is absent. Where defendant 
acts in pursuance of a bona fide claim which he is assert-
ing honestly, although wi'thout right ... such defendant 
will not be penalized in damages for asserting such 
bona fide cLaim in good faitth." WARD v. MID-WEST 
& GULF CO., 97 OKLA. 252, 223 P.l70. 
"Had pl:aintifif :inttroduced evidence showing iflhe tax 
deed ro be patently void on its £ace, or had he ffitlab-
Jished thrut defendant ha:d conspired with (another) ... 
or had he inrtroduced any other evidence indicalting :the 
mootgage was recorded in bad fiailt'h to cloud plaintiffs' 
title he migftlt have established his right to recover such 
damages as we recoveraHle under a theory of slander 
of title, but n01thing of tfuis kind appears in tf!he record." 
DRAPER v. J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., (Utah 
Supreme Court) 204 P. 2d 826. 
There is notlling in the record to indicate that plaintiffs' 
Ex!hibit "I", the 'agreemenrt of Sather to assign m appellants, or 
the lis pendens ba•S'ed i!he.t"'On is patently void, and no evidence 
in 1tlhe r.eco'l1d to indicate that the lis pendens "·as filed in bad 
hitlh. In fact ilt is manifestly apparent f1rom the record ·tha:t 
Sather and Birch, having full knowledge of tiDe equitable in-
tei~es't of the appellanlts acquired by virtue of the agreement set 
fm1~h in said E:x~hibit •T', and tthe subsequent pa~·ment made by 
Fuller, coi11Spired to defea1t sudh interest and tha·t !the ·lis pendens 
was filed in good fai1th to pr01tect such equitty. Tthe record would 
not permi1t any contrary connotation €'VE"n if tlle agreement were 
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declared to be null and void and 'such dedanuti:on was supported 
by some •smadl shred of evidence in the ·reoord. 
Absent any showing of bad ·Faith on the part of ,tfue ap-
pellants and any lmowledge on their part ·that the terms of such 
agreement !had been lawfully abrogated rllere wa1s no evidence 
to support I1espondents' :conlrention that appdllanltls s•landered 
their title wilt!hout oause and •such oaUJse of action ~should have 
been dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING RE-
SPONDENTS JUDGMENT UPON THE SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRESPASS. 
"In an action of trespass the board rules of evidence 
in ciVIil actions ... are 'applioab1e; ... The principle 
is fund"cllmeniflal that the burden of proof in any oause 
rests upon the par1ty who aSisents the affirmative of an 
issue ... Where several persons are engaged togett:her 
in a common purpose and a 'trespass is committed by 
one oc more of 'them, assent t!hereto by !the otheT'S is 
presumed only if lthe eommon des:ign is umawful. Where 
th object 'to be accomplished is a lawful orne, ass:ent is 
a mUJt1tler of fact itJo be proved. 52 AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 889, Trespass, Sootions 75, 76, 77. 
The reoord is en!t:iTely barren of .any evidence that the ap-
pellants, Judith Hyde Ful1er, Ruby F. Judd, and Fowes1t W. FuJ-
ler, ever entered upon the land of rthe respondents and/ or ever 
perfomned ·any ams vesul!fling in the damage complained of. 
Likwise is the record bawen of any shred of evidence t!hat the 
oo-defendanlts Kernnetlili W. Judd, F. A. Hattah and/oT t!heir em-
ployees WeJ:'Ie aoting unde!I' the co!llltr!Qil, at the direction, fior the 
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benefit, or wi~h lthe ass1ent: of said 1t1hree named appellants. Nor 
is there any evidence in the recovd that any of tihe panties wme 
aOb.irng in conoeJ.'It one with 1the other. "Wil:rtle tile plaintiff need 
not proV!e his oruse beyond a J.'leasonable doubt, evidence affovd-
ing only 'a brus1s fur mere speculaJtion and conjooture as to the 
caus1e of pl1ainltiffs' injuries is wholly insufficient as a basis upon 
which to J.'lest a verdict fur damages." 52 AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 892, Trespatss, Section80. 
In dris connection it is significant to note t!h3!t !the trial Judge 
fOIUnd wi~th vespect to F. A. Hatch, upon .faots much stronger 
tlha.n exist against these respondents, rthat he was not Hable for a 
money judgmoot in trespass. I•t is also significanlt to note thwt 
fue case againlSit the co-defendants Salther, named in all of the 
agreemenltJs with respondents, was dismissed upon the motion of 
respondentJs. H tthel'1e is any basis for liability against respondents 
Judi,th H~de Fuller, Ruby F. Judd, and Forrest W. Fuller, it 
moot, if ·at a:H, exislt outside of the record. 
With. respeot to the appellant, Kenneth W. Judd, ilt must 
be ·admirtted 1t!hat he entei!ed upon the land of :respondents, but 
wit!h tTt~e oons·ent of respondems. (Tvansoript, Birch, D 7, 8, 9; 
C 53-54). In BOBO v. YOUNG et 'al, 61 So. 2d 814, it was stated, 
" . . . if an awner of land ·consents for anotlher Ito go upon it 
atnJd ·t!he other 1ac'hs on that oonsent and incurs labor and expense 
in connection lllherewilth, tthat consent cannot be later withdrawn, 
nor is the other party Hable in damages for trespass." 
The responderlits made no arlltempt to distinguish between 
the damages cau~ed by appellant Judd and the defentdarnt Hatch, 
and fmther made no effu11t Ito dist:ingui~h between damage done 
priOT to July 4, 1957, when respondents ordered Hattch off the 
propffilty (Transcript, Bwch, 4 14-15) and damages for subse-
quent .enltries. l1t may thus be observed tiliat from the record 
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only pure conjecture rus to what part of the damages Kenne1th W. 
Judd was directly flespons,ible for, 'if any, and as t10 wiha:t dam-
ages, if any, accrUied ~ruEter July 4, could ,dJetennine any 
Habi1ity. Conjectur"e and spec u 1 at ion upon ttth'e part of 
the trier of the faahs should not mplruce p1a:inltiffs' burden of 
proof. Since the Court appar'oottly £0ll[)jd some exCtllse for 'f'lhe 
admi!tted and proved trespaJs'ses of Hatch it then becomes im-
perative to de~termine which, if any, of the damages were caused 
by Judd or ihis agOOJts and which by H~ah, £or .. wbJen rtwo or 
more to:rt-fea:sms aoting i~n~depoodenit1y of 1eadh oltlher inflid an 
injUT)' ... Ollie Oa.Illllat be held liable for ,flhe ·trespwsses of the 
other ... " 521 AMERrCAN JURISPRUDENCE, TIOOSpruss, 
861, SectiJOin 31. From lt'he record it becomes manifestly 'apparent 
that no such dleterminaltion is possible. 
CONCLUSION 
The faotls :in 'l:!h:is oase do not appear 1to be malteri:ally in con-
flict. The erllibits were introduced 'and idenll:ified by respond-
ents and ,aftl rtestirnoo.y referred to herein was from witnesses 
called by respondents. The respoDJdooltl.s have failen futaly short 
of provmg 'eilther t!he elemenJts of slander of tilt'le or with any 
slight certalinty facts nooesg~ary to 'hold appellanlts 'nable in tres-
pass. 
The denial by the DiSitrict Courtt of appellaJnJts' motion to 
dismi·ss 'and the judgmoot granrted were in error and shou:ld be 
re¥ersed. 
RlespectfuHy subm~tted, 
GORDON I. HYDE and FORREST 
W. FULLER, Afitomeys for 
Defe:ndaJI1lt-Appellimts. 
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